In the years since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the federal government’s policies that deal with national security have changed significantly. In an effort to prevent the results of science and engineering research from being misused or falling into the wrong hands, government agencies that support studies are placing restrictions on how unclassified research is conducted, how information is exchanged, and who is allowed to participate in the process. Longstanding policies such as the National Security Decision Directive 189 — established under the Reagan administration and reaffirmed under the current administration to ensure that results of basic research are published and open to participation by all — are often being ignored.
To be sure, that has had a direct impact on how universities and research institutions operate. But of far greater concern are the unintended effects of such policies for the nation. Rather than strengthening national security, the restrictions are instead impeding the nation’s ability to be economically competitive and defend itself against potential threats.
We recently chaired a nonpartisan committee of the National Research Council, composed of university officials and former national-security leaders, and examined those issues. We traveled around the country to hear from both sides — the defense and intelligence experts and the academic researchers — and found that both groups agreed that the scientific and technological gains that result from the open exchange of research findings greatly outweigh the risks to security. Indeed, meeting the challenges of future technological or biological threats depends on developments that can come only from long-term academic research. The best way to protect the United States, we concluded, is to ensure the open exchange of such unclassified research.
It’s time for researchers and intelligence officials to work together and devise policies that strike the appropriate balance between science and security. Toward that end, our committee recommends that the federal government establish a standing entity, preferably a high-level Science and Security Commission chaired by the national-security adviser and the director of the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy.
Such a commission should consider many issues. First it needs to stop the erosion of NSDD 189. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, many research institutions have reported more restrictions on participation in government contracts and research grants, as well as more limits on publishing. And although Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has since reaffirmed the tenets of NSDD 189, unnecessary restrictions persist.
In addition, the commission should review the growing number of research projects that are categorized as “sensitive but unclassified,” a designation that limits the scientific community’s right to publish the research results and restricts participation of foreign-born scientists.
Restrictive export-control policies also need to be reviewed. The U. S. Departments of Commerce and State both maintain lists of technologies and information that are barred from export to foreign countries. Many of the items now restricted are technologically outdated, widely available through the Internet and other sources, or available and not controlled in other countries. Having both science and security interests regularly review and revise those lists would make sure that the process is working as intended.
Also important would be the commission’s ability to open lines of communication and cooperation between science and security experts. The structured collaboration of the commission would provide an ideal venue. Even though university researchers and intelligence and defense personnel are often in agreement on common goals, they “talk past” each other regarding these issues. When they do come together to discuss them, the interactions frequently occur in haste as a reaction to government policies that have been proposed without any initial input from scholars. Establishing a formal channel for regular communication between the two groups could prevent such problems.
Continuing discussion also could help all parties recognize the truly global nature of science today. The nation’s leaders must understand and help all Americans understand that, as a country, the United States has no exclusive ownership of ideas or knowledge. Scientific discoveries and technological advances made in our country often depend on knowledge from abroad. Consequently, fostering an open and productive environment for international scholars in science and engineering is critical if the United States is to maintain its leading edge in those fields.
Fully one-third of all Ph.D.'s in science and engineering in American academic institutions are now awarded to foreign-born graduate students. If the United States wants to continue attracting the best and brightest minds to its colleges, the government and Congress should consider extending temporary visas for those working in high-demand research areas and create a new non-immigrant visa category for doctoral and postdoctoral scholars. Although the drop in international-student enrollment since the September 11 attacks has eased, the visa-clearance process should continue to be monitored, and restrictions placed on foreign-born students and scientists working on legitimate technologies should pertain to only those areas of study that have high-risk implications for national security.
Finally, action is needed to bridge the underlying cultural divide between scientific and security experts that is so often at the root of poor policies and unnecessary roadblocks for both groups. Many experts in the intelligence field don’t fully comprehend the need for open scientific communication and the participation of foreign-born researchers. In turn, experts at universities and research institutions fail to grasp the concerns of security and defense officials about the potential exploitation of academic research or the responsibilities that export controls place on researchers.
To remedy the problem, our committee proposes that universities and the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, State, and other relevant government agencies allow university scientists to participate in government-security fellowships, and national-security experts to participate in university fellowships. The Intergovernmental Personnel Act Mobility Program, which “provides for the temporary assignment of personnel between the Federal Government and state and local governments, colleges and universities, Indian tribal governments, federally supported research and development centers, and other eligible organizations,” should be explored as a mechanism for facilitating those exchanges. In addition, the proposed Science and Security Commission should be encouraged to work with the FBI’s National Security Higher Education Advisory Board to create the fellowships.
Such exchanges would provide participants with hands-on understanding of the challenges that each group faces in balancing science and security. In addition, university leaders — at the level of senior vice president for research — must educate administrators, faculty members, and students about the importance of security policies and compliance.
National security and scientific progress for economic growth are not mutually exclusive goals. Indeed, it would be impossible to achieve one without the other. Developing policies and procedures that reflect that truth will go a long way toward ensuring that our nation thrives and prospers well into the future.
Jacques S. Gansler, professor of public policy at the University of Maryland at College Park and former under secretary of defense, and Alice P. Gast, president of Lehigh University and former associate provost and vice president for research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, chaired the National Research Council committee that wrote the report “Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World.”
http://chronicle.com Section: Commentary Volume 54, Issue 44, Page A56