Klare X. Allen stands in the middle of the gravel parking lot that may one day house Boston University’s “biocontainment” laboratory, pointing out landmarks. Her arm sweeps in a semicircle, past the county jail, past Interstate 93, and past the flower wholesalers, before stopping at the parking lot’s entrance. “That,” she says, “is where the AK-47 guards will be.”
The nondescript lot in the university medical center’s BioSquare research park, in Boston’s South End, is the last stop on an “environmental-justice tour” that takes participants past some of the biggest blights in adjacent Roxbury: the abandoned electrical-plating plant, the particleboard public housing, the bus depots, and the trash-transfer stations.
The lab would be yet another burden on her low-income community, Ms. Allen says, inviting accidents and terrorism. She fears an accidental release from the lab -- designated a “Biosafety Level 4,” or BSL-4, because it would study the most dangerous microbes -- could infect thousands in the densely populated area with anthrax bacteria, the Ebola virus, or another deadly pathogen.
“What would possess anybody to put this type of facility in the heart of Boston?” wonders Ms. Allen, an organizer for Alternatives for Community & Environment, a neighborhood group.
The neighborhood opposition is yet another hurdle for Boston University, which had to beat fierce national competition to win the lab contract from the National Institutes of Health last fall, and still needs to obtain environmental and land-use permits from local, state, and national agencies before starting the $178-million construction project.
University leaders say they are optimistic that they will receive the permits, adding that no other site is being considered. They maintain that Boston -- with its booming biotech industry -- is the ideal place to study infectious diseases.
Bioterrorism “may be the biggest biomedical challenge in the coming decade,” says Richard J. Towle, the university’s senior vice president. “Boston, as a biomedical-research center, ought to be involved.”
The university estimates that the project would create 1,300 construction jobs and 660 permanent jobs. The lab has won the support of Thomas M. Menino, Boston’s mayor, and of most local union leaders, who say it will be a plum for the city, filling a void left by the manufacturing and shipbuilding industries.
Still, the neighborhood activists are not alone in their opposition. Chuck Turner, a member of the Boston City Council, has introduced a resolution that would ban Biosafety Level 4 research in the city, and a group of 165 Boston-area scientists and scholars sent a letter to the mayor, the city council, and Boston University trustees in April urging them to cancel the project.
The letter, signed by the Nobel Peace Prize recipients Eric Chivian, a psychiatry professor at Harvard Medical School, and Bernard Lown, professor emeritus of cardiology at the Harvard School of Public Health, warned of “real and potentially catastrophic risks to the health and safety of people in the local and surrounding communities.”
As Boston University tries to move forward with the laboratory, it finds itself in the middle of a larger national debate about the need for the labs and the research they might contain. Some academics complain that the lab and similar bioterrorism facilities are draining money and talent from more pressing public-health problems, like AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Others warn that the research here could violate the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, which prohibits biological-weapons development but allows for defensive research on pathogens.
“The lab represents the growing militarization of public health,” says H. Patricia Hynes, a public-health professor and director of Boston University’s urban-environmental-health initiative. “It’s contributing to the bioterrorism brain drain of public health.”
Every Seam Is Sealed
Sitting in his ninth-floor office on Commonwealth Avenue, flanked by his safety and communications directors, Mr. Towle explains the safety measures that will help prevent a leak or theft at the lab. There will be back-up ventilation systems. Researchers will wear protective biohazard suits without pockets and will be disinfected before leaving.
Kevin M. Tuohey, executive director of operations and public safety, lists several more: a 150-foot setback from the road, a 24-hour security staff, rules requiring two people to be present when hazardous materials are used, and devices on the doors to prevent trespassers from “piggybacking” on entering employees. Access will be controlled using biometrics and iris scanners, and deliveries will arrive using the highway, not the neighborhood streets, he adds.
Biosafety Level 4 labs are “the safest labs in the world,” asserts Mr. Towle, likening the lab to “a submarine within a vault.” He adds that there has never been a release from any of the five Biosafety Level 4 labs in North America in their 77 combined years of operation.
Lab opponents dispute that statistic. While there is no public record of accidents or security breaches at Biosafety Level 4 facilities, the Council for Responsible Genetics, a group that opposes genetic engineering, has compiled a list of more than a dozen “mistakes” that have occurred at Biosafety Level 2, 3, and 4 laboratories since 1985. Those mishaps, which were documented in the news media, include the disappearance of anthrax bacteria and Ebola viruses from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, in Frederick, Md., in the 1990s, and the discovery of vials containing live anthrax spores and Ebola during a 2003 Army-led excavation, intended to eliminate hazardous waste, of that facility’s grounds. The council also notes that the anthrax spores used in mail attacks in 2001 have been traced to one of a small number of sophisticated government or corporate laboratories.
Those reports have Alma Feliciano, a Roxbury resident, so rattled that she has vowed to return to Puerto Rico with her four children if the lab is built.
“I’m concerned about our kids,” she says. “This is very scary.”
In an effort to allay such fears, Boston University has held nearly 60 community meetings and spoken to hundreds of people, administrators say. “We’ve been everywhere we can possibly be,” Mr. Towle says. “We’ve accepted almost every invitation. We understand we have opposition, but we also have significant community support.”
Several members of the city council have also sided with the university, accusing opponents of scaremongering.
“Rather than rumors, rather than scare tactics, rather than Chicken Little the-sky-is-falling, let us deal with the facts,” James M. Kelly, a Democratic member of the council and a sheet-metal worker, said at a hearing he convened on the lab in April.
But opponents say they have cause for alarm. They say the university has been secretive and unresponsive from the outset, failing to consult with residents before applying for the lab contract, and providing minimal notice of public hearings. They say residents were not even aware that the university was a candidate for the lab until the spring of 2003, barely six months before it received the contract.
“They’ve continually tried to hinder information from getting out there,” says Stefan Hassleblad, a freshman at the university and program coordinator for Boston Mobilization, a student group that opposes the lab.
Boston Mobilization and Alternatives for Community & Environment have put up 100 advertisements on the subway, with a picture of a giant dartboard superimposed over the Roxbury area and the words: “Outbreak! Notice! There is a bioweapons-research lab being built in the South End/Roxbury.” They hope to have another 100 ads in place in time for the Democratic National Convention, in late July.
In Galveston, Tex., which was also awarded a Biosafety Level 4 laboratory by the NIH last fall, the situation is markedly different. Residents there say the University of Texas Medical Branch has been forthcoming from the start, meeting with residents early on to respond to their concerns.
“They did a good job informing the general public and the neighbors,” said Robert J. Mihovil, program director for the University Area Association, a neighborhood group in Galveston.
Flood of Federal Money
Biodefense research has become a big business since the still-unsolved mailings of the bacteria that cause anthrax in 2001, accounting for $1.6-billion in spending by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases alone last year. The agency’s budget for biodefense has more than tripled since 2001, while additional federal money has gone to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Agriculture.
The infusion of cash by the federal government has led to a scramble among colleges and universities, as researchers have rushed to capitalize on the biodefense building boom. Beyond Boston University and the University of Texas Medical Branch, nine other universities received awards of between $7-million and $21-million last fall to build less-secure Biosafety Level 2 and 3 labs.
The new biocontainment facilities, which will develop diagnostics, vaccines, and treatments for anthrax, Ebola, and other lethal diseases, will fill profound gaps in the nation’s public-health system, says Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
“These high-level research laboratories will provide the secure space needed to carry out the nation’s expanded biodefense-research program in a setting of safety for both biodefense workers and the surrounding community,” Dr. Fauci told the U.S. House of Representatives’ Select Committee on Homeland Security this month.
Dr. Fauci said the anthrax attacks made it clear that bioterrorism “represents a serious threat to our nation and the world.”
In May the institute announced that it wants to spend an additional $125-million in the 2005 fiscal year to support five to eight new Biosafety Level 2 and 3 laboratories of at least 30,000 square feet each.
But some biodefense experts say the building spree -- which will more than double the amount of Biosafety Level 4 laboratory space -- is overkill. They say the threat of bioterrorism has been overstated, and they argue that terrorists prefer more easily accessible weapons, such as fertilizers, bombs linked to cellular telephones, box cutters, and jet fuel.
Some suggest the money could be better spent securing poorly protected bioweapons facilities in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, where dangerous germs could be bought or stolen by terrorists. A Defense Department program set up in 1991 to secure those sites has not been given an adequate budget, they charge.
“It’s been a real missed opportunity,” says Louise Richardson, executive dean of the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study and an authority on terrorist movements.
Ms. Richardson says the new labs could actually undermine national security by training more people in the use of deadly pathogens. “You’re increasing the likelihood that one of these people will have sympathies with terrorist organizations, or simply be deranged,” Ms. Richardson said.
But Ken Alibek, a former top scientist in the Soviet biological-weapons program who defected to the United States in 1992, defends the need for the labs, saying the United States has neglected biodefense for years. “There’s no question that we need these labs,” he said. “We need to develop protections against these pathogens.”
Some public-health professors also push the argument that biodefense is diverting money from more mundane public-health problems. David M. Ozonoff, an environmental-health professor at Boston University’s School of Public Health, likens biodefense to a “cancer that is hollowing out public health from within.”
The emphasis on biodefense is “draining resources, talent, and intellectual effort” from other priorities, he says.
Officials at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases argue that the investment in biodefense will actually yield “positive spinoffs” for the more common and naturally occurring infectious diseases that ravage the third world. They say that the research will enhance scientists’ understanding of the human immune system, improving their ability to treat diseases.
“New infectious diseases have been emerging at alarming rates, while existing threats have continued to spread into new areas,” says James M. Hughes, director of the National Center for Infectious Diseases at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in Atlanta. He noted that in 2003 alone, SARS emerged, monkey pox appeared in the Western hemisphere, and the West Nile virus continued its spread across the country.
Crossing the Line?
But some scientists and opponents of the laboratories fear that the research could be used for less-peaceable purposes.
The United States officially renounced biological weapons in 1969, three years before the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention was signed. That treaty barred research on offensive weapons, but contained an exemption for “prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.” The Bush administration has interpreted that to mean that it can produce pathogens for the purposes of developing counterterrorism measures.
Some opponents of the lab say the proposed research pushes against the treaty’s prohibitions, treading dangerously close to the offensive side. They warn that the research could encourage other countries to revive their own weapons programs.
“This is the beginning of a biological-arms race,” David Ludlow, a Boston resident, warned at the city-council hearing.
Mark S. Klempner, the Boston University Medical Center’s assistant provost for research, categorically denied that the laboratory would be used for bioweapons development. “This is absolutely not a biological-weapons facility,” he said at the hearing. “This is a facility about the public health.”
But critics say the government should do more to reassure skeptics, including establish an independent oversight panel. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity -- created to monitor life-sciences research -- is inadequate because its charter is set to expire in 2006, and it does not review classified research, says Milton Leitenberg, a senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland at College Park. Mr. Leitenberg suggests something more akin to the National Academy of Sciences, which is a nonprofit society chartered by Congress to provide advice about science and technology.
Critics are also troubled by language in the federal government’s request for proposals that stipulated that the lab facilities “must be used for biomedical purposes as determined by the NIAID program needs for at least 20 years.” Critics see that as further proof that the lab could be forced by the federal government to do classified research.
Rona Hirschberg, a senior program officer at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, says the language is standard in contracts with the agency, and stressed that the facility will be owned, operated, and managed by Boston University. She says the agency can propose research, but the university can choose to accept or reject it. Ms. Hirschberg also notes that the institute does not conduct classified research.
Asked whether the laboratory could conduct classified Defense Department research, she says that “would be up to BU.”
Mr. Towle, the university vice president, adds that all research conducted at the lab will be reviewed by a faculty committee. “The government can’t dictate what we will do,” he says. “They can tell us what they will fund, but not what we can do.”
Still, some fearful residents remain intent on derailing the project. “Roxbury has been left out more than anybody else, but not anymore” vows Dolly Battle, a resident of the neighborhood. “We have to let people know that they’re going to have to consult with the community.”
LABS FOR STUDYING THE DEADLIEST DISEASES Last fall the National Institutes of Health awarded Boston University and the University of Texas Medical Branch, in Galveston, $128-million and $110-million, respectively, to build Biosafety Level 4 laboratories for the most-secure study of dangerous microbes. It also offered smaller grants to nine other universities to build somewhat less secure BSL-3 and BSL-2 laboratories.

| 
| |
* University is expanding its facility.
|
SOURCE: Chronicle reporting
WHAT IS A BIOSAFETY LAB? National “biocontainment” laboratories study the most dangerous diseases. While all biosafety labs must follow specific safety measures, Biosafety Level 4 labs-- which study the most hazardous pathogens-- require the highest levels of security and safety for researchers working with the deadly agents.
Biosafety level | | Agents studied | | Safety Measures |

|
1 | | Do not cause disease in humans. | | Researchers follow basic safety procedures, including hand washing and eating outside the laboratory. |

|
2 | | Cause disease in humans, like Junin virus and Rift Valley fever. | | Researchers wear gloves and eye protection, and use waste-decontamination facilities. |

|
3 | | Cause disease in humans and are spread through the air. Diseases are serious or lethal, like the plague, West Nile virus, anthrax, and yellow fever. | | Clothing is decontaminated, windows are sealed, buildings have specialized ventilation systems. Access is controlled, and exhaust air is not recirculated. |

|
4 | | Same as Biosafety Level 3, but have an unknown cause of transmission. Diseases are usually life-threatening, like hemorrhagic fever and those caused by the Ebola virus. | | Researchers wear full-body, air-supplied suits and shower when leaving the facility. Labs occupy isolated zones within a larger building. |

|
SOURCE: Chronicle reporting |
http://chronicle.com Section: Government & Politics Volume 50, Issue 42, Page A28