To the Editor:
David K. Hecht’s “How Scientific Celebrity Hurts Science” (February 26) begins with a very unfortunately worded question: “Why should we believe what scientists have to say?”
This question should perplex any reasonably trained scientist; after all, we don’t train people to “believe.” Scientists train people to question ... and ask to see the data.
Scientists don’t enshrine ideas, even if we do celebrate their impact and honor those who contributed to them. After all, the highest status of belief that an idea can attain in science is theory. That’s why scientists never “believe” that their search for truth is complete. Yes, there are some examples of scientists who gave up the quest for deeper truth; Ernst Mach comes to mind. However, science as a whole is a continuous, collective search for answers; that’s why science never dies — it attracts new scientists who keep the search alive.
Many scientists see belief as entirely orthogonal to knowledge. One doesn’t trump the other — they exist in entirely separate spaces. Belief is concerned with things that we probably cannot prove, through actual measurement and data; it is more about personal thought. Knowledge, on the other hand, is a commodity that is collected, shared, and repeatedly verified. Thus belief and knowledge could not be more different.
All this said, I suggest an alternative beginning to the article: “Why should we place our trust in celebrity scientists?” Now that is a very good question.
Keith A. Williams
Visiting Professor
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Virginia
To the Editor:
David K. Hecht asks “Why should we believe what scientists have to say?” but goes on to use “science” and “scientists” interchangeably, as if to suggest what reputed scientists choose to say reliably (or by definition) constitutes science. It does not. Whether a scientist’s public statements represent actual science depends on the interplay of at least three factors: how deeply motivated by self-promotion or issue advocacy a scientist is, how personally celebrated a scientist becomes, and how willing they are to expand on and exploit that celebrity for personal advantages of any sort.
Scientists widely celebrated in the media as personalities are too often deferred to as if they’ve outgrown the standards of peer review; sometimes even the standards of common sense. Scientists “do” science, but when they publicly transgress the practical limits of their methods or demonstrable expertise without explicit notification, they commensurately degrade science as a believable enterprise. The moral hazard of “reach exceeding grasp” eventually confronts every specialist because answering “I don’t know” delimits their authority, and thereby their prospects of being asked for a further opinion.
In an ideal world, whether what scientists say is believable should not depend on name recognition, accumulated titles, prizes won, or media profiles. It should stand on its merits, which are too rarely self evident. As a result, scientific believability and lay judgments regarding what constitutes valid science depend on the ability of publicity professionals to attract media interest. Successful public scientists then willingly subordinate the role of scientist to that of media professional. They are abetted in this by institutions that train them in the requisite arts, because whether we believe what scientists have to say is now determined primarily by how and where they said it.
Matthew K. Chew
Assistant Research Professor
School of Life Sciences
Arizona State University