Skeptics criticize libertarian paternalism
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler present “libertarian paternalism” as a benign creed, an overdue introduction of cutting-edge behavioral and social science into the realm of policy making. They insist that giving people a psychological nudge to make socially desirable decisions is a “relatively weak, soft, and nonintrusive type of paternalism because choices are not blocked, fenced off, or significantly burdened.” And they carefully stipulate that nudges are not mandates, but merely gentle prods based on knowledge of how people make — often flawed — choices. Some other scholars, however, remain unconvinced, cautioning that libertarian paternalists are in serious danger of overreaching, and that a well-meaning nudge can easily become a heavy-handed shove. Objections focus on three main issues:
The Slippery Slope
Does libertarian paternalism start us down a slippery slope toward more-aggressive government interventions? Edward L. Glaeser, a professor of economics at Harvard University, points to the history of cigarette regulation as a classic example of how some mildly paternalistic policies tend to build support for hard paternalism. The initial 1964 U.S. surgeon general’s report warning that cigarette smoking was a “health hazard” has led to a litany of taxes and even outright bans. Glaeser, who published a widely discussed critique of libertarian paternalism in the University of Chicago Law Review, sees the plight of smokers as evidence of a potentially dangerous pattern whereby the vilification of a certain activity by public-relations campaigns makes the public more amenable to increasingly draconian measures aimed at curtailing that practice.
Glen Whitman, an associate professor of economics at California State University at Northridge, shares Glaeser’s concern. Whitman imagines, for example, the introduction of a mild “fat tax” that would nudge people toward a healthier diet. But once the apparatus for enforcing a fat tax was in place, measures would probably be slowly ratcheted up because, Whitman argues, “slippery slopes thrive in the context of a gradient” — and people are unlikely to resist small changes or even notice them. Whitman, who has published a number of papers critical of Sunstein and Thaler, says that many libertarian-paternalist ideas have “no buttress or barrier to prevent movement down that slope.”
Sunstein and Thaler respond that their recommendations — like adopting a standard of “presumed consent” for organ donations, assuming that all citizens are consenting donors but allowing them to switch their status if they wish — have low-cost opt-outs. But critics are still cautious.
The Dangers of Subliminal Manipulation
Is it acceptable for a fast-food restaurant to line its walls with flattering mirrors to make people feel good about eating more? Or for a school cafeteria that wants to promote healthy eating to install intentionally unflattering mirrors to nudge chubby students to eat less? When confronted with such scenarios, Sunstein and Thaler fall back on a principle of transparency: Private businesses — or governments — should adopt only policies that they would be willing to defend publicly.
Glaeser is skeptical that transparency alone is a sufficient safeguard against the potential hazards of subliminal manipulation. He worries about the consequences of employing ever-greater levels of psychological sophistication to encourage and discourage certain behaviors. “Sunstein and Thaler suggest that this is a type of paternalism that libertarians can love. I don’t agree with that,” Glaeser says. “It’s a good and important idea that I am glad is out in the public discourse. But the notion that all of us who have worried about the abuse of government power throughout our lives should suddenly think, ‘Wow, great, we don’t have to worry about that anymore,’ doesn’t ring true to me at all. It is still going to be subject to abuse.” While Glaeser agrees that some libertarian-paternalist ideas should be adopted as policy — especially in the private sector, where they will be regulated by the market — he says that we need to have a “robust debate about them if we are going to select the right ones, because the right answer is not that they are all good; the right answer is that there are a small number of them which are actually good, and we will get to them by arguing about them vigorously.”
Thus Glaeser suggests a conservative approach to any paternalistic interventions, limiting them to areas — like steering people away from dangerous drugs and suicide — where there is clear evidence of self-harm. His hope is that a limited approach will help provide a check against undue manipulation, because once government gets deeper into the business of subliminal persuasion, he says, what is to stop it “from being used to sell particular politicians rather than to do things that are agreed upon as being good?”
The Human Flaws of Bureaucrats
If behavioral economics posits that all people are susceptible to cognitive biases and errors that can be used to nudge them into better behavior, why would government decision makers be any more likely than ordinary citizens to make good choices? “These are insights about people, not markets,” Bryan D. Caplan says about behavioral economics. Caplan, an associate professor of economics at George Mason University and author of The Myth of the Rational Voter (Princeton University Press, 2007) warns that “politicians suffer from the same problems voters suffer from.” That fact alone should dampen enthusiasm for more government intervention, he adds.
“People have been too quick to take Sunstein’s and Thaler’s results and say this is why Milton Friedman is wrong about markets being good and government being bad,” Caplan says. “Government actually winds up looking worse when you realize that people aren’t fully rational.”
Sunstein and Thaler concede that incompetent or corrupt government nudgers can do a great deal of harm by directing people toward bad choices. But they emphasize that in many areas — from personal finance to health — people are ill informed, inexperienced, and therefore ill equipped to make the choices that are in their own self-interest, and government has the resources to hire experts who can help demystify an increasingly complex world.
Glaeser counters that even well-meaning government employees are less likely to make good decisions than private citizens, lacking the same incentive to look out for their own welfare. Simply put, a bureaucrat does not care as much about another individual’s well-being as that individual does. Private decision makers are therefore more likely to put in the necessary effort to make the choice that is right for them. Unless, of course, they’re inadvertently nudged in the wrong direction.
http://chronicle.com Section: The Chronicle Review Volume 54, Issue 31, Page B10
