Advisory committee makes recommendations on research security, transnational repression
A federal academic-advisory council is urging the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to do more to tackle research security and transnational repression, including strengthening cross-governmental coordination, sharing risk assessments and recommendations for best practices with colleges, and working with higher-education and Asian American groups to limit inadvertent harm to researchers from government policies.
The Homeland Security Academic Partnership Council, an appointed group of school and college officials, approved a report with findings and recommendations during a meeting on Monday. Alejandro Mayorkas, the U.S. secretary of homeland security, had asked the panel to make “malign” influence by foreign governments and other overseas actors one of two priorities, calling it a “persistent and increasing” problem for higher education.
The potential vulnerability of colleges to foreign governments seeking to poach American know-how and intellectual property has been a high-profile issue for more than half a decade, as research and innovation has moved to the forefront of U.S.-China tensions. But the issue of transnational repression is less well understood, said Miriam Feldblum, a co-chair of the subcommittee examining foreign malign influence.
In the report, Feldblum and her colleagues note that there is no consistent definition of transnational repression, which refers loosely to actions taken by authoritarian governments to suppress dissent among their citizens abroad, including harassment, intimidation, and surveillance.
There is also a need for more systemic and concrete data collection. While Freedom House, a human-rights group, has called intimidation of international students and scholars on American campuses an “everyday threat,” much of what is known about the phenomenon is on a case-by-case basis, such as a furor over the removal of posters critical of the Chinese Communist Party at George Washington University and the conviction of a Chinese student at Berklee College of Music for stalking and threatening a fellow student and pro-democracy activist.
It is critical to “move beyond alarming anecdote” and gather evidence to better “detect, track, and quantify” the frequency of transnational repression, said Feldblum, who is also the executive director of the Presidents’ Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration.
College leaders may not be aware of transnational repression or realize that it’s a problem on their campuses. In fact, several administrators told the subcommittee that they receive “nearly no reports” related to the issue.
That, however, may be because international students self-censor or assume that such threats are baked into the experience of studying overseas, the report said. Students may be afraid they are being monitored while abroad and that what they say or do could affect their futures and families back home. China’s Ministry of Public Security, for example, has a hotline for reporting students who criticize the government.
Getting a sense of how widespread the problem is will be critical, the report said. It suggests that the federal government develop training modules so international students can better identify transnational repression and work with colleges on protocols for reporting, with the option to do so anonymously.
Faculty and staff members need more education, too. Campus and local police could be called on to respond to such incidents, but they are likely to have little understanding of transnational repression, John Ojeisekhoba, an advisory council member, said during Monday’s meeting. “I can say with high confidence that training is so badly needed,” said Ojeisekhoba, who is an associate vice president and chief of campus safety at Biola University and a former president of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators.
The federal government should adopt a “whole-of-government strategy” to deal with transnational repression, with the Department of Homeland Security taking charge of developing and disseminating tools, best practices, and other resources, the subcommittee said. The FBI could jointly lead the effort, with responsibility for reporting and investigations. And both could work with colleges to develop a clearinghouse to promote the timely sharing of data.
In recommending a “coordinated, transparent, intentional approach,” Feldblum said the panel was heeding lessons from the initial handling of concerns over research security, which was marked by inadequate government outreach, a lack of clarity about perceived risks, and inconsistent rules and guidance among federal agencies. Since then, collaboration and engagement has improved across the government and between federal officials and college leaders. The FBI created an academic liaison program to maintain regular channels with its field offices, and it could be expanded to include transnational repression.
Still, when it comes to research security, the government could do more, the report said, including publishing regular risk assessments for universities and harmonizing research-security reporting and compliance across agencies. It could also consult more closely with higher-education associations and Asian American groups in policy making to avoid unintended repercussions for students and scholars. The rocky early response to research security — in particular, the federal probe of academic ties to China known as the China Initiative — has been blamed for discouraging international collaboration.
Mayorkas, who attended Monday’s advisory council meeting, said he planned to immediately share the report with other government leaders with responsibility for dealing with foreign malign influence.
