In her Liberties essay, Epstein likewise describes the way that the study of history has been sharply dichotomized:
On the one hand, there are traditional military and diplomatic historians. Broadly speaking, they see themselves, and are seen by others, as continuing to study old topics (hard power, high politics, dead white men, and so on) using old methods of archival research. On the other hand, there are nontraditional historians of race, gender, and sexuality, who see themselves, and are seen by others, as studying new topics (knowledge production, the personal as political, historically marginalized groups, and so on) using new methods of critical theory. The methodological commitments of the two types are understood to imply corresponding ideological commitments, and vice versa: “Traditional” history is coded as conservative or politically right-of-center (for its defenders: hard, manly, substantial, tangible), while “woke” history is coded as progressive or politically left-of-center (for its critics: soft, effete, flimsy, intangible). Of course this dichotomy is an oversimplification, but it is one that I think many historians would recognize, however grudgingly.
But she argues that any association of one of these tendencies with quality and rigor and the other with amateurishness is misleading. In fact, she says, a lapse in scholarly standards afflicts both sides: “Call it the horseshoe of scholarly incompetence.”
Like Maza, who points out that some of the best history has been overtly stimulated by political conviction — she names E.P. Thompson’s classic The Making of the English Working Class, motivated both by general left-wing investments and by a revisionist attitude toward conventional Marxist accounts — Epstein holds no brief for the idea that political commitment necessarily makes bad history. “If historians’ left-wing ideological commitments lead to better scholarship than that produced by historians with right-wing views — as was the case with so much women’s, African American, and working-class history in the 1950s and 1960s — then great. If historians’ right-wing commitments lead to better scholarship than that produced by historians with left-wing commitments, then great.”
But ideological polarization along lines of topic and method, Epstein suggests, means that whichever side one is on, evidentiary and argumentative standards deteriorate as like-minded peers rubber-stamp their allies’ work. And that, she says, is not just a problem of the academic left. “Where an identitarian historian seeks contemporary relevance by reducing the complexity of the past into a tale of white supremacy, a diplomatic historian seeks the same relevance by reading the past backwards through today’s foreign-policy categories — and both twist the historical evidence to conform to their present-day agenda … If you think that diplomatic and military historians do not plagiarize, fake their footnotes, and wave their buddies’ lousy work through peer review, then I have an exciting time-share opportunity on a river in Egypt that I’d like to discuss with you.”
Read Sarah Maza’s “Presentism and the Politics of History” and Katherine C. Epstein’s “Historians Killing History.”